




















Hidden language ‘battles’ in the diaspora: Linguistic identities and ideologies 





Abstract: Following a critical sociolinguistics approach to language maintenance in the 
diaspora, this paper investigates interplaying linguistic identities and ideologies towards 
home and host languages among four case-study Pakistanis living in Catalonia, a 
Catalan/Spanish-speaking European society. By drawing on fieldnotes, interviews, 
naturally-occurring conversations and visual materials gathered in a Barcelona call 
shop, it shows how informants invest in Spanish as the ‘integration’ language, despite 
being categorised as ‘deficient’ users of it. They present themselves as ‘native’ speakers 
of Urdu, which indexes modern ‘Muslimness’ and ‘Pakistaniness’, while Punjabi users, 
associated with the ‘yokels’, are silenced. English is ambivalently taken-up as an intra-
group sign of educational status and political power and as an anti-Muslim ‘coloniser’ 
language. Overall, these stratifying sociolinguistic behaviours reveal how Pakistanis’ 
home/host multilingual resources get re-ideologised through linguistic hierarchisations 
which foster the maintenance of majority languages only, dismissing minority language 
speakers, in unchartered transnational contexts where these are already ‘delanguaged’.  
 
Keywords: Language ideology; linguistic identity; language maintenance; transnational 
migration; Pakistani diaspora; Catalonia  
                                                          
1
 Universitat de Lleida, Departament d’Anglès i Lingüística, Plaça Víctor Siurana 1, 25003 Lleida, 
Catalonia, Spain. E-mail: <maria.sabate@dal.udl.cat>; http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6058-7227 
2
 Acknowledgements: I thank the informants who participated in this study, as well as the guest editors 
of this Special Issue and the anonymous reviewers, for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this 
manuscript. Any shortcomings are mine. 
This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness; under 




1. South-Asian migrants in Europe: The case of Pakistanis in Catalonia 
 
Mass migration to Catalonia, a society of approximately 7.5 million inhabitants located 
in North-Eastern Spain, occurred during the first decade of the twenty-first century, later 
though more intensely than in other European countries (Codó, 2008). Most migrant 
registrations took place in 2000, 2001 and 2005, when the Spanish government (in 
control of citizenship in Catalonia), on having the highest percentage of undocumented 
populations in Europe, issued three extraordinary legalisation campaigns (Sànchez, 
2008: 251). These campaigns were a strategy to meet the pressing European 
requirements concerning the common supranational standards for the control of 
‘illegal’
1
 foreigners, because they allowed the Spanish Ministry of the Interior to obtain 
a record and to police undocumented migrants by registering them as ‘visitors’ or 
‘temporary residents’ (Kostova Karaboytcheva, 2006).  
Partly as a consequence of these newer mechanisms of migrant bureaucratic 
registration and control, the percentage of transnational populations residing in 
Catalonia increased notably between 2000 and 2010; particularly for ‘foreigners’ born 
in South Asia, who became the fourth migrant group, mostly composed of Pakistanis, 
accounting for 2.94% of the total population in Catalonia (Idescat, 2018a). This 
Pakistani community consisted basically of single men of varied socioeconomic and 
religious backgrounds, aged 30.4 on average (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011), whose 
migratory trajectory to this host society was a way to enter the European Union (EU) in 
order to protect transnational-family economies and to seek socioeconomic 





1.1. Legality and employment context 
 
Pakistanis in the diaspora mostly settled in Barcelona, the Catalan capital. This choice 
of locality was an informed decision undertaken before migrating, after they had 
established contacts with one of the most powerful diasporic Pakistani networks in 
Europe. This network had managed to engage in a particular work policy that granted 
them ‘documentation’ on condition that they registered (and self-identified) as ‘self-
employed micro-entrepreneurs’ in the Spanish Social Security (Solé, Parella & 
Cavalcanti, 2007). With this legalisation ‘tactic’, self-employment increased notably, 
and accounted, for the first time, for 23.42% of all foreigners’ registrations in the 
Catalan Social Security system (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 2010). Of 
all registered Pakistanis, 13.09% of them opted for this formula in order to access 
temporary legality status (Secretaria de la Immigració, 2009). 
The new self-employed Pakistani entrepreneurs, together with other groups of 
business-minded migrants mostly from China, Romania and Bulgaria (Migracat, 2011), 
quickly transformed the small local shops that were then available for rent in the 
Barcelona metropolitan area into ‘Chinese’ bazaars, ‘Latino’ hairdressers and 
‘Pakistani’ call shops. These migrant-tailored ‘ethnic’ businesses became a success, and 
transnational micro-entrepreneurs soon required employees in order to man them. 
Following profit-making market rationalities aimed at attracting cheap labour, migrant 
employers started to recruit co-nationals with whom they had no family ties or 
emotional involvement (Solé, Parella & Cavalcanti, 2008), offering those migrants in 
need of ‘documents’ part-time contracts that, in actual practice, were frequently 




1.2. Sociolinguistic context 
 
The sociolinguistic context that Pakistani employers and employees found during their 
incorporation process in Barcelona is as follows. Catalonia is a bilingual society with a 
majority and a minority language, Spanish and Catalan, whose public and private uses 
and social meanings, linked to local identity issues, are very complex. Spanish is the 
dominant language of all territories comprised under the Spanish nation-state, as well as 
a global lingua franca. Today, this dominance is reinforced by a political project of 
recentralisation geared towards Spanish-only policies (Pujolar, 2015), which includes a 
language test demanding a basic level of Spanish as a requirement for ‘naturalisation’ 
(BOE, 2015: 105524). Catalan is a minority language which has been historically 
persecuted and politically, economically and culturally minoritised (see Woolard, 2016). 
It is not recognised as an official language by the EU, and it is regarded as a 
‘vernacular’ code, despite the Catalan government’s attempts to present it to migrants as 
a de-politicised ‘language for everybody’ (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2016). Foreign 
populations are addressed in, and tend to choose to learn, the majority language first 
(Pujolar, 2010). In this sense, Spanish has become the ‘barometer’ whereby to judge 
migrants’ degree of ‘integration’, in institutional and non-institutional contexts, and 
among migrants themselves (Sabaté-Dalmau, 2018). This is so despite the fact that 
Catalan is also required for socialisation, as a command of it, along with Spanish, may 
ensure access to key citizenship resources (like more employment opportunities) in 
Catalonia.  
Linguistic diversity has been recognised in most institutional arenas (e.g. in 
public administration), and more than 300 allochthonous languages have been registered 
by Catalan authorities (Linguamón, 2010). However, there are no specific policies 
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protecting them, and their management is somehow unrealistic, conducted via the 
symbolic (non-utilitarian) recognition of very few migrants’ nation-state languages. 
Urdu, for example, which is the privileged statutory ‘national’ language in Pakistan 
along with English (categorised as the ‘official’ language), now has some minor 
presence in Catalan schools’ ‘linguistic diversity’ programs, ‘ethnic’ businesses’ 
commercial signs, and foreign worker associations’ documents (Linguapax, 2017). 
Most Pakistanis in Catalonia, though, have a limited command of Urdu only, since they 
come from regions where the most frequently used language is Punjabi, a devalorised 
‘regional’ language with no institutional roles in Pakistan. In fact, Urdu is estimated to 
be the mother tongue of only a small minority (7.35% - 7.57% of the Pakistani 
population), whereas Punjabi is estimated to be the home language of almost half 
(44.15%) of the Pakistani population, according to the latest approximate calculations 
provided by Rahman (2006: 73) and the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017). This 
provides evidence that migrants’ home languages remain largely unknown (and not 
effectively managed) in Catalonia. 
 
 
2. The research project  
 
2.1. Aims of the study  
 
The aim of this paper is (1) to investigate the language practices and ideologies of a 
small network of Pakistani migrants in Barcelona concerning both their host and home 
languages, and (2) to explore how these may account for their local and global 
linguistic identity ascriptions or disaffiliations. More specifically, it analyses Pakistanis’ 
views on Spanish and Catalan, and focuses on how these interplay with, and mutually 
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inform, their conceptions of Urdu, English and Punjabi,
2
 in presentations of the self and 
of others as legitimate or non-legitimate (native) speakers of these languages. I depart 
from the assumption that the incorporation of Pakistani migrants’ uses and 
sociolinguistic behaviours towards all the languages involved in their socialisation 
processes in Catalonia is crucial in order to provide a comprehensive rationale of their 
complex multilingual communication dynamics in the diaspora. The third objective is 
(3) to understand the extent to which, how, and why, this small Pakistani network re-
territorialises home-language uses and social meanings and invest in home language(s) 
maintenance. All in all, this paper suggests that the analysis of Pakistani migrants’ 
ideologies and (dis)-affiliations towards both home and host languages may offer a 
picture of truly diasporic (i.e. simultaneously locally and globally informed) 
sociolinguistic behaviours. This may contribute to problematize understandings of 
migrants’ linguistic incorporation practices that focus mostly on transnational 
populations’ (unidirectional) enculturation into host-society norms, downplaying the 
roles that home language practices and linguistic identity affiliations, socially re-
stratified and ‘hierarchised’ (Phillipson, 1997: 238) in the diaspora, may play in them 
(see Kuczynski, Parkin & Pitman, 2014; Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002).  
   
 
2.2. Theoretical considerations 
 
I take a critical sociolinguistics ethnographic approach to the social meanings of 
language ideologies and identities of the global era, and I understand them as being 
mutually constitutive (Duchêne, Moyer & Roberts, 2013). Following this perspective, I 
interpret the informants’ positionings towards host and home languages in political 
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economic terms (Flubacher, Duchêne & Coray, 2018). That is, I argue that they need to 
be explored as being ingrained both into the local language dynamics and norms in 
which informants socialise and into the global socioeconomic processes and political 
structures which govern citizenship regimes (for example, via language tests for 
‘naturalisation’) and language-based personhood legitimacies (in Catalonia, Pakistan, 
and elsewhere).  
I conceive of language ideologies as empirically observable indexes of the 
institutional as well as the mundane social norms which materialise in, and govern, 
daily individual and collective language comportments and attitudes towards languages 
in a particular time and space (Schieffelin, Woolard & Kroskrity, 1998). Similarly, I 
understand linguistic identity practices or acts as a lens into how individuals affirm, 
accept or reject who they (and others) are, in situated communicative interactions. That 
is, I approach presentations of the self as tools to explore how informants negotiate the 
other- or self-ascription of particular language resources (like ‘native-speakerhood’, 
‘standardness’ or ‘accent’) leading to the emergence of particular ethnolinguistic 
categorisations, belongings and affiliations (Heller, 2010).  
The framework outlined here places emphasis on the multilingual individual as 
the mobiliser of language practices, identities and ideologies, and as the agent and the 
locus of language maintenance and language change/shift in transnational contexts (see 
Pujolar & O’Rourke, 2016). In this project, though, a word of caution concerning the 
concept of the migrant (home/host languages) multilingual speaker is in order. The 
sociolinguistic contexts of Pakistan and Catalonia (here only outlined, for space 
constraints) are completely different, since their historical, political and socioeconomic 
conditions make it not possible to establish parallelisms between them. Pakistan, 
frequently troubled with violence (see UN, 2019), is an officially (postcolonial) Islamic 
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country with a governance system based on religion, whereas Catalonia is officially a 
secular society (as stated in the 1978 Spanish Constitution). The multilingualisms in 
both societies are hardly comparable, too. In terms of ‘autochthonous’ languages, in 
Pakistan there exist more than 70, including English, Urdu and Punjabi, which are, 
respectively, the official, national and regional languages (the latter along with Sindhi), 
together with three other ‘major’ languages with no institutional statuses: Pashto, Siraiki 
and Balochi (Lewis, Simons & Fennig, 2011; Rahman, 2006) – by contrast, officially, 
in Catalonia there are only two ‘allochtonous’ languages (see Section 1.2). This means 
that the linguistic categorisations used by informants when they name home and host 
languages, as well as the ideological associations that they make between languages 
(e.g., when they draw comparisons between Urdu/Spanish and Catalan/Punjabi; in 
Section 3), shall be understood as the informants’ discursive tools and narrative 
strategies to make sense of, and to try to present, the meanings that terms like 
‘language’ and ‘dialect’ bear in both societies.         
 
 
2.3. Methods, data and participants 
 
The data presented in this paper comes from a larger project, which consisted of a two-
year network ethnography of 20 migrants who were born in Pakistan, Morocco, 
Romania and various countries of Latin America. They were aged between 27 and 52, 
and arrived in Spain between 2002 and 2010. Most of them were undocumented, 
under/unemployed and unschooled. They networked daily in a migrant-tailored ‘ethnic’ 
call shop, run by a 27-year-old Pakistani employee, which welcomed between 61 and 
157 clients a day, and which was located in a Spanish-speaking, impoverished working-
class neighbourhood in the Barcelona metropolitan area. In the said larger project, the 
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call shop served as an alternative migrant institution where migrants (particularly the 
undocumented) could gain access to resources for transnational subsistence (like advice 
on legality issues, rooms for rent, cheap phone calls or remittances services) off the 
radar of registration authorities (for the details on this project see Sabaté i Dalmau, 
2014). 
This paper zooms in on the daily lives of a small group of four Pakistani men 
within this larger network of 20 migrants, whom I approach as case-study informants 
whose transnational lives are illustrative of the diasporic self-employer and employee 
profiles described in Section 1.1. I shadowed these four informants for two years 
(between 2007 and 2009), at the very least twice a week, for two to 12 hours (I moved 
to the neighbourhood and lived in a block of flats next to the call shop where they 
networked). The four informants (with pseudonyms) were the following:
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(1) 41-year-old Shabbir was a member of the Pakistani intelligentsia born in an 
urban town in the Kashmir area. He migrated alone in 2006, rented a flat with 
five relatives, and started to work as a self-employed construction worker. 
(2) 42-year-old Sheema, from a small Pakistani rural town without electrical 
infrastructure, migrated in 2005 and was then living with his wife and two 
adolescent children. He was working informally as a waiter in a ‘Latino’ bar, 
while simultaneously studying to obtain a taxi-driver license. 
(3) Yousaf, a 41-year-old electrician, non-literate, arrived in 2002 from a small rural 
Pakistani town, unemployed and homeless, lived in Sheema’s flat.  
(4) Naeem, the call shop worker, was born in Gujranwala, near Lahore, the second 
biggest city in Pakistan, and was then living with four young Pakistani adults. 
He had been hired as a part-time employee by a co-national employer who 
owned three more ‘ethnic’ businesses in different towns, and, at the time when 
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the study took place, was suffering exploitation, being forced to work 12-hour 
shifts and not having been paid for three months. 
From the larger project described above, the following data was selected for this paper: 
(1) extensive ethnographic fieldnotes, with seven ethnographic snapshots,
4
 (2) five 
excerpts and short statements taken from three audio-recorded semi-formal interviews 
(conducted in front of the call shop or in the ‘Latino’ bar, in the languages of the 
informants’ choice),
5
 and, finally, (3) two hand-written notes selected from all the visual 
materials gathered in the ‘ethnic’ business. 
 
 
3. Analysis  
 
The analysis section is organised as follows. I first focus on the informants’ self/other-
ascribed identity categorisations as (non)-legitimate (or non-speakers) of their host-
society languages, Catalan and Spanish, and on their practices and attitudes towards 
them (Section 3.1). I then analyse three of their home languages, firstly by exploring the 
multifaceted linguistic ideologies, connotations and identity (dis)-affiliations with 
English, which vary depending on whether these were mobilised within the Pakistani 
network (in an intra-group manner) or in public, in interactions with local populations 
or with other migrant groups (Section 3.2). Secondly, I present the informants’ positive 
attitudes and identity affiliations to Urdu, by means of which they display alignment 
with, and belonging to, the (diasporic) Islamic nation-building project for present-day 
Pakistan (Section 3.3). In the third place, I explore the silenced life of Punjabi, for 
which informants show disaffection in public, on constructing it as an unimportant 
minority language of scarce intimate use, with identity connotations linked to illiteracy, 
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rurality and socioeconomic backwardness (Section 3.4). The overall findings of this 
section concerning the meanings of these sociolinguistic hierachisations and linguistic 
identity dynamics, and what they can reveal with regard to home language maintenance 
(or change) in the diaspora, are presented in Section 4.                     
 
3.1. Host languages: Delanguaging the Pakistani diaspora 
 
‘Hablar en español, que estamos en España’ [Speak in Spanish, we are in Spain] 
(fieldnotes 30/08/2008). This is what Jenny, an unemployed 35-year-old local single 
mother, said to call-shop worker Naeem, while he was having a smoke and conversing 
in Urdu with his 20-year-old flatmate Rachid.‘¡Habla más claro!’ [Speak more 
clearly!], complained Ronny, a middle-aged unemployed Bolivian, when trying to 
follow Naeem’s instructions to move to another phone cabin, on another occasion 
(fieldnotes 30/06/2008). ‘A mi no me gusta el pakistaní, sólo el árabe’ [I don’t like 
‘Pakistani’, I only like Arabic], Yalda, a 12-year-old girl born in Morocco (and 
schooled in Barcelona), told Naeem later that summer (fieldnotes 22/08/2008).  
These three remarks are illustrative of the local populations’ as well as of other 
migrant groups’ attitudes towards the Pakistani diaspora’s host and home language 
resources. The first comment illustrates how Spanish is ideologically constructed as the 
code which indexes ‘proper’ migrant sociolinguistic behaviour (in fact, the three 
remarks were made in this language), and of how ‘allochtonous’-code uses get 
reprimanded, with their users being categorised as ‘non-integrated’ or as ‘unwilling to 
integrate’. As I have shown elsewhere (see Sabaté-Dalmau, 2018), Catalan is not 
considered to be part of the language repertoires in the neighbourhood under study, and 
questions concerning Pakistanis’ use of Catalan indexed surprise, disbelief and even 
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annoyance. This is illustrated by Shabbir, who commented that ‘En cinco seis años no 
he visto ni una persona hablar catalán’ [In five six years I haven’t seen a single person 
speaking Catalan] –despite the researcher’s use of this language with him (interview 
10/08/2008).  
The second comment epitomises how Pakistani migrants are attributed 
‘immigrantese’ foreigner talk (Ferguson, 1975), which ascribes this diaspora 
‘incompetent’ and ‘deficient’ Spanish-speaking identities. Further evidence of this was 
provided by Naeem, who kept asking me to ‘correct’ his SMS written in this language, 
and who kept telling me ‘¿Lo ves? No les gusta’ [See? They don’t like it [my Spanish]] 
when he faced comments like Ronny’s (fieldnotes 30/06/2008). The third and last 
comment illustrates that other migrant networks in the call shop (and local populations, 
too) have scarce knowledge of the Pakistani diaspora’s languages, and that this 
Pakistani group gets attributed a linguistic identity as monolingual speakers of an under-
defined code called ‘Pakistaní’, following a monolingualist ‘one nation, one language’ 
approach to multilingual resources (Piller, 2015).  
All in all, this demonstrates that informants were not seen as proficient host-
language users, despite their insistence on presenting themselves as efficient speakers of 
one of them, Spanish. Efforts to ‘prove’ continued and effective Spanish-language 
learning investments were seen, for example, when Sheema presented himself as a 
‘Paquistaní medio español’ [half-Spaniard Pakistani] (interview 24/09/2008); when 
Shabbir ‘Spanishised’ his name by calling himself ‘Chema’ (/’ʈSemɑ/), and insisted that 
‘Nosotros hablamos de de castellano’ [We speak of of Castilian] (interview 
10/08/2008); or when Naeem chose the option ‘Spanish Spain’ (i.e. Peninsular Spanish) 
as the default language of all computer programs in the call shop. Thus, despite their 
efforts to show compliance with the expected norms of sociolinguistic interaction in 
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Spanish-only in the neighbourhood, informants are dispossessed of host-language 
resources and are assumed to be conducting their transnational lives in a largely 
imagined (and maintained) home language. 
 
3.2. Home languages: ‘English es number one en el mundo’ 
 
All informants constructed English in positive terms as a global lingua franca, rather 
than as a home language, and they publicly (and proudly) presented themselves as 
proficient users of it. The informants’ emphasis on the positive connotations of this 
language in the global sphere, rather than on their local (colonial) heritage values, which 
downplays the ‘institutional-language’ role that English has today in most spheres of 
social life in Pakistan, may be related to the fact that the ‘official’ status attributed to 
English there is controversial. This is so because the 1973 Pakistani Constitution states 
that ‘the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are 
made for its replacement by Urdu’ (Rahman, 2006: 74), with a subclause (in Article 
251) which explicitly allows for the use of English as the dominant language until the 
(underspecified) ‘arrangements’ are made for the officialisation of Urdu to be made 
effective in the fields of administration, law, education and commerce. In other words, 
the Pakistani Constitution implicitly assigns English a de facto ‘national’ status and 
grants it a higher rank than Urdu, the home language of choice and of (religious) 
identity affiliation of the informants (see Section 3.3). This may explain why they left 
the local uses, roles and connotations of English as a key local language in Pakistan 
unmentioned. 
The informants’ self-identification with the use of English as a global lingua 
franca helped them to counteract identities that categorised them as ‘non-literate’ or 
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‘non-schooled’, particularly in written communication. This is so because for Catalans, 
as for Pakistanis, English is a sign of education. While adult Pakistanis tend to 
understand spoken English, most Catalans are not proficient enough to use it effectively 
for intercultural communication (Eurobarometer, 2012: 11; Idescat, 2018b). This does 
not mean that English-speaking Pakistanis are attributed higher linguistic competence in 
oral practice, though, since ‘Pakistani English’ (as defined in Rahman, 2015), like most 
South Asian Englishes, tends to be dismissed as ‘incomplete’ and faulty, in Catalonia 
(Codó, 2008). Both facts (Catalans’ low command of English and Pakistanis’ censoring 
of their oral competence in it) may explain why English was not used by informants to 
interact with locals or with other migrant groups.     
This diaspora uses written English primarilz as a resource to navigate 
technology-mediated communication. It is also a (symbolic) resource to present 
themselves as having a command of global technoliteracy in English (which local 
neighbours may not possess). In this sense, English was the transliterating code 
employed in written mobile phone communication, to navigate between the (Perso)-
Arabic script and the Roman alphabet when using Urdu (and/or Punjabi). It was also the 
translation tool employed to access imprecise information provided in Spanish, by 
means of the application Google Translator. The use of English for English-Urdu (or 
Punjabi) transliteration and for the self-ascription of English-user identities is illustrated 
in Excerpt 1 (see transcription conventions in the Appendix), with the case of Shabbir. 
In our interview, Shabbir claims to communicate by English SMS with relatives (lines 4 
and 8), and to use English-only phone settings, too (lines 5-6), with a keyboard in the 
Roman alphabet, as a matter of ‘preference’ (line 10), ‘easiness’ (line 16) and 
immediacy (‘quickness’; line 18). Also, he emphatically shows proof of English 
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command in the written mode (and therefore, of global technoliteracy) by reading each 
of the English setting names in his mobile phone to the researcher. 
 
Excerpt 1 
 @Bck: 10/08/2008. Bar near the call shop. Shabbir (SHA) talks about the languages in 
which his SMSes with Pakistani relatives are conducted, and shows his phone 
settings to the researcher. 
 1 *RES: y los del Pakistán no mandan mensajes? 
  %tra: and those from Pakistan don’t they send messages? 
 2 *SHA: también mandan. 
  %tra: they do as well. 
  [...]  
 3 *RES: y en qué lenguas? 
  %tra: and in which languages? 
  4 *SHA: lengua de inglés. 
  %tra: English language. 
  5 *RES: en inglés # <y tiene el setting del móvil en inglés también> [?]. 
  %tra: in English # <and do you have the mobile phone setting in English too> [?]. 
  6 *SHA: sí. 
  %tra: yes. 
 7 *RES: vale. 
  %tra: ok. 
  8 *SHA: siempre utilizo inglés lengua de inglés. 
  %tra: I always use English the English language. 
  [...]  
 9 *RES: y cómo es eso? 
  %tra: and why is this so? 
  10 *SHA: porque me prefiero este # por eso [=! laugh] sabes # mira. 
  %tra: because I prefer this one # that’s why [=! laugh] you know # look. 
  %act: Shabbir shows his mobile phone setting, the researcher reads the screen out loud. 
 11 *RES: names. 
 12 *SHA: sí este. 
  %tra: yes that one. 
 13 *RES: applications. 
 14 *SHA: eso. 
  %tra: that’s it. 
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 15 *RES: es más fácil de entender así? 
  %tra: is it easier to understand like this? 
  16 *SHA: para mi es más fácil sí. 
  %tra: it’s easier for me yes. 
  [...]  
 17 *RES: sí. 
  %tra: yes. 
  18 *SHA: he aprendido más rápido por eso. 
  %tra: I have learned more quickly that’s why. 
 
Use of English depended on whether informants interacted with Pakistani compatriots 
or with local neighbours and other migrant groups. In general terms, and in public, 
informants associated English with cosmopolitan transnational identities invested in the 
consumption culture, understood in positive terms as being a sign of engagement with a 
‘global citizenship’, as outlined above. This is seen with Naeem’s insistence on playing 
English pop music by Céline Dion on the central computer (he was the one who said 
that ‘English es number one en el mundo’ [English is number one in the world]), and on 
Rachid’s demands for combining this pop music with American hip hop (see 
Pennycook, 2007, for an analysis of similar post-modern identities mediated through 
English).  
Among Pakistanis, though, attitudes towards English were multifaceted and 
ambivalent, since for them, knowing about the ‘official English’ debates in Pakistan, 
this seemed to be a politicised language also in terms of personal religious affiliations 
and of socioeconomic professional positions, in Pakistan as well as in the diaspora (see, 
also, Paolillo, 1996). For Sheema, who, when Naeem or Shabbir  spoke English or 
listened to English music, stated (in English!) ‘I hate English!’, this language was 
envisioned as part of a neocolonial project of supranational control exerted upon former 
English-speaking colonies like Pakistan (under British rule until 1947). Sheema’s 
construction of English as a ‘coloniser’ language in the Muslim world is part of his 
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transnational political and religious project to reject military intervention in his Islamic 
home country. He even denied having English resources and strongly criticised English-
user identities mobilised by other Pakistani informants, whom he categorised as being 
unfaithful to an Islamic political mode of governance and to an Urdu-speaking Muslim 
identity, which he understood as being part and parcel of the modern Pakistani nation-
building project with which he aligns (see, also, Section 3.3).  
In socioeconomic terms, English was an intra-group sign of class distinction (as 
detailed in Mansoon, 2004; Rahman, 2002). For Shabbir, for example, English was 
indexical of a superior class status of the wealthy intelligentsia in Pakistan, which 
includes business people, lobbyists, military officers and high-rank bureaucrats 
(particularly for those who, like him, migrated from Punjabi-speaking regions to urban 
cities and capital regions). He tried to re-appropriate this status in order to present 
himself as a more advantaged migrant when networking with other Pakistanis in 
Catalonia. Shabbir’s wife was an English teacher, and his children (living in ‘Pakistani’ 
Kashmir) were being educated in an English-medium private school (mostly reserved 
for economically advantaged Muslims, in Kashmir), which allowed him to present 
himself as part of an upper-class elite with powerful transnational contacts (he actually 
signs his SMSs with ‘Mughal’, in Urdu, which stands for ‘mogul’ or ‘influential 
person’; fieldnotes 24/12/2008). He chose to mobilise his socioeconomic and 
educational trajectory (attained through his investment in English) when interacting 
with Sheema, who was unschooled and was born in a rural town with defective 
electrical infrastructure, when they both competed for the leadership of the Muslim 
community in Barcelona (for instance, when working on a petition to establish a 
mosque in the neighbourhood). In this sense, English-speaking identities are used as ‘a 
passport to privilege’ (Rahman, 2005: 24) to reinforce pre-existing social class, political 
18 
 
and religious statuses, which get re-territorialised and can be observed in the ‘internal’ 
social organisation of informants. These power dynamics reveal their (partly symbolic) 
‘language battles’ or competitions of linguistic capitals for the leadership of the local 
Muslim group or for gaining access to contacts with other Muslim members of the 
European Pakistani diaspora, which seemed to pass unnoticed by local populations and 
other migrant groups alike.  
 
3.3. Home languages: ‘Hope is in Urdu’ 
 
Urdu was the home language which informants chose as a modern lingua franca in daily 
communication among themselves, regardless of whether they were Urdu- or Punjabi-
dominant speakers, once again engaging in the monolingual mind-set. It was, in fact, 
presented as the taken-for-granted legitimate nation-state language of Islamic Pakistan, 
following the frequently circulated precept that ‘service to Urdu is service to Pakistan’ 
(widely commented in media reports; see, e.g., Raj, 2017)..  
The use of Urdu as a migrant Pakistanis’ lingua franca is seen, for instance, when 
Sheema found an offer with cheap phone cards to call Pakistan written in Spanish, and 
decided to translate it into Urdu in order to make it accessible to the Urdu-reading 
community (fieldnotes 4/09/2008). This also turned Urdu into one of the ‘institutional’ 
commercial languages of the place, now demarcated as a ‘Pakistani’ business (and, I 
believe, as a Muslim space), in an institution (a call shop) which does not normally 
recognise its entrepreneurial use (none of the 30 telecommunications businesses that 
were operating in Spain at that time, including ‘ethnic’ operators targeting Pakistanis, 
offered customer services in this language; see Sabaté i Dalmau, 2012).  
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Urdu indexed both traditional and modern ‘Pakistaniness’ for all informants, and 
was presented as a ‘symbol of unity’ (Rahman, 2006: 74). As outlined in the previous 
sections, in 1948 Urdu was made ‘the national language’ by the President of the 
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and first Governor-General Ali Jinnah, member of 
the Pakistan Muslim League, who was born in Karachi when this city was still under the 
British India’s rule, and who pioneered the Pakistan movement to become a Muslim-
majority state, independent from predominantly Hindi India.   
 Urdu was the first language that informants mentioned when they were asked 
about their linguistic backgrounds and multilingual resources. The presentation of Urdu 
as ‘the language of Pakistanis’ is illustrated by Shabbir, who shows how he was 
learning Spanish in order to pass his taxi-driver licence theory test by translating 
specific vocabulary into Urdu first, and then to English, as a second-place language (see 
connotations concerning English in Section 3.2), written below, and placed at the 




Figure 1. Public use of Urdu by a Pakistani learner of Spanish, placed before English, which was 




Shabbir gave me an Urdu-Spanish dictionary so that I could learn ‘their language’, and 
he kept showing me videoclips with pop songs by Roxen (‘Hope’, in Urdu), mobilising 
a feeling of pride in public (home) ‘national’ language use, taking it for granted that it is 
the ‘real’ Pakistani language, to the detriment of Punjabi – leaving controversial policies 
concerning the ‘Urdufication’ of minority language-speaking communities in Pakistan 
(like the Punjabi- and Bengali-speaking communities) unmentioned (see, also, Section 
3.4).  
There were also some minor attempts to present Urdu as the language to be 
employed in public among Pakistanis as a legitimate language of incorporation, which 
challenges the ‘Spanish-as-the-language-of-integration’ dictum. This was so, for 
instance, when Shabbir seemed to position Urdu as ‘better’ than Spanish, on one 
occasion in which he opposed Pakistanis’ communicative politeness to that of the local 
‘españolas’ ([‘Spanish women’]), who, he claimed, lacked manners, indirectly 
presenting the informal registers of this host language with censorious overtones, and 
attributing local women low (religious) morality values: ‘Dicen cago en Dios, coño, 
joder… ¡Esto es muy malo, eh!’ ([They] say goddamnit, damn, fuck…. This is really 
very bad, eh!) (fieldnotes 22/08/2008).    
 
3.4. Home languages: ‘Punjabi es como catalán’  
 
Yousaf and Naeem were ‘native’-speakers of Punjabi, a language which they could use 
with Shabbir, who was proficient in it, too. However, in public, the three of them 
seemed to make this language choice invisible, in sociolinguistic behaviours denoting 
some degree of embarrassment for having been born into a ‘vernacular’ code which it is 
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not considered a ‘national’ language, as opposed to other regional languages like 
Sindhi, also minoritised, which has fewer speakers (about 14.1% of the Pakistani 
population; Rahman, 2006: 73, Pakistan Bureau Statistics, 2017). In fact, it has been 
noted that in some parts of Pakistan ‘there is a culture-shame about Punjabi’ (Rahman, 
2006: 80), which includes the denial of a ‘mother-tongue’ command on the part of some 
educated speakers as well as complaints about the ‘Punjabisation of Urdu’ (see Siddiqi, 
2012: 97). This is so because Punjabi is associated with the language of the ‘Paendu’ 
(i.e., the illiterate ‘provincial poor’ and the ‘yokel’; Rahman, 2006: 74) – as well as with 
the language for mockery in informal contexts, in the form of songs and jokes This may 
be the reason why informants’ intra-group communication in Punjabi tended to be 
relegated to the backstage, demeaned as anecdotal and unimportant, and even at times 
hidden as having occurred in ‘Urdu’.  
For Urdu-dominant Pakistanis like Sheema, who did not allow his children to 
use Punjabi at home in Pakistan, conversations among informants in Punjabi were 
object to reprimand. This is so not only because of the socioeconomic connotations 
mentioned above, but also because the use of Punjabi was taken up, by informants like 
Shabbir, as a sign of (religious) ‘ethnic resistance’ (Rahman, 2006: 83) –in this case, in 
the diaspora- to the Islamic Pakistani nation-building project (particularly by minorities 
from the northern Eastern regions), with which none of the informants wanted to be 
associated. The negative connotations that this minority home language had within the 
Pakistani network are illustrated in Excerpt 2, where Shabbir and Yousaf reflect upon 






 @Bck: 22/08/2008. Bar near the call shop. Shabbir (SHA) and Yousaf (YOU) talk about 
their ‘home’ languages and equate the sociolinguistic status of Punjabi in Pakistan 
to that of Catalan in Catalonia. 
 1 *RES: y: vosotros en qué habláis en urdu en casa? 
  %tra: a:nd you what do you speak do you speak Urdu at home? 
  2 *SHA: sí: punjabi. 
  %tra: yes Punjabi. 
 3 *RES: ah punjabi! 
  4 *YOU: es como catalán. 
  %tra: it’s like Catalan. 
  5 *SHA: cada uno país tiene uno: # <cómo se llama> [?] # como catalán o como punjabi y 
siempre en casa y hablando así. 
  %tra: each one country has one: # <what is it called> [?] # like Catalan or Punjabi and 
always at home and talking like this. 
 
Shabbir had told me that he normally spoke Urdu at home, so I had wrongly assumed 
that his flatmate Yousaf would also use Urdu to talk to him. However, Yousaf was not 
born in the Kashmir area, and both in Pakistan and in the flat that they shared he mostly 
spoke Punjabi (as explained by Shabbir in line 2), which is much more frequently used 
than Urdu in Pakistan (see Section 1.2). Yousaf, offering clarification, explained that 
Punjabi is a language that is ‘like Catalan’ (line 4). Shabbir, expanding on this, stated 
that the sociolinguistic role that Punjabi fulfils in their home country is that of being 
‘the more relegated language’ that most states tend to have at the backstage, aside from 
their respective official or national languages; that is, a language to be used in private 
(line 5) – locally and transnationally.  
What I infer from Shabbir’s and Yousaf’s attitudes toward Punjabi and Catalan 
is that they perceived both languages as having only intra-family, or intimate, use. The 
description that they provide almost resembles that of a case of diglossia, where the 
supremacy of both Urdu and Spanish and the inferiority of Punjabi and Catalan are 
taken for granted. I argue that this may be so because of the discursive strategies 
mobilised by the informants to try to unpack the complexities of the Pakistani 
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sociolinguistic context, with non-comparable labels for institutional or official statuses 
(such as, ‘national or ‘regional’). In sum, Excerpt 2 shows that Punjabi, like Catalan, 
was conceptually placed outside the call shop and the neighbourhood, and it was not 
conceived of as a language that belonged to the diasporic Pakistanis’ public multilingual 
repertoire.  
The language ideologies and identities around Punjabi, as well as the linguistic 
hierarchisations described so far, though, were at times challenged. This is seen when 
someone in the call shop posted a hand-written message in Punjabi, posting this 
language in the linguistic landscape (i.e. the multilingual iconography) of that diasporic 
place (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: The presence of hidden-in-public minority home languages like Punjabi in an ‘ethnic’ business 
(with confidential information removed). Picture taken from Sabaté i Dalmau (2014: 138).   
 
Informants explained that the message in Figure 2 was addressed to Naeem, a Punjabi 
defender, for it called the persons from Gujranwala (like him) ‘heroes’, reading ‘Hero 
puray Gujranwale da’ (‘You are the hero of the whole Gujranwala’), with the word 
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‘hero’ in English, capitalised. I suggest that this digraphic note in the call-shop wall 
may also be interpreted as an ‘intra-group’ sign of support to a migrant employee who, 
by virtue of being ‘delanguaged’ (Gal, 2006) or dispossessed of home and host 
communicative resources on a daily basis (as a speaker of ‘immigrantese’ Spanish), was 
also ‘deskilled’ in terms of work-management abilities by local and non-Pakistani 
clients who complained about his ‘poor’ customer services. In this regard, small texts 
like the one in Figure 2 may be read as minority home-language maintenance actions 
against their ‘ideological erasure’ (Irvine & Gal, 2000), which may speak of resistance 
to social exclusion of silenced minorities within migrant groups in the diaspora, at least 
in this Muslim ‘Pakistani’-demarcated place. 




The analysis presented above offers five main findings concerning the meanings of the 
linguistic hierachisations and identity enactments involving host and home languages. 
These may contribute to an understanding of language maintenance practices in the 
diaspora. Firstly, with regards to findings concerning host languages, the data shows 
that informants make every attempt to invest in the majority language, Spanish. This is 
the language required by the administration for naturalisation, by local populations for 
incorporation into the neighbourhood, and by migrant groups for intercultural 
communication (regardless of their linguistic backgrounds). It also provides evidence 
that, despite their efforts to present themselves as proficient users of this language, and 
in spite of their presentations of self as law-abiding persons ‘willing to integrate’ 
through the learning of this code, informants are categorised as ‘deficient’ Spanish 
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speakers. Therefore, they are systematically delegitimised as majority host-language 
speakers. Secondly, the data concerning Catalan shows that this language is conceived 
of as being external to the informants’ social enculturation and, in this regard, this 
minority language is, in ideology and in practice, excluded from migrant socialisation 
spaces and, generally, from Spanish-speaking neighbourhoods.   
With regards to the three findings concerning home languages, the analysis 
illustrates, first, how informants, in public, construct English as a global lingua franca 
(rather than as a home language), and mobilise it to align themselves with modern 
‘global-citizen’ presentations of the technoliterate post-national self. The data also 
shows, though, that, among themselves, English is highly politicised, on holding the 
status of the de facto ‘national’ language (in direct competition with Urdu), in Pakistan. 
On the one hand, it is at times rejected as being part of current anti-Muslim political 
projects exerted upon Pakistan, and, as such, it is presented as a ‘coloniser’ language. 
On the other hand, for informants who come from (Kashmiri) advantaged 
socioeconomic and educational backgrounds, English is mobilised as a sign of political 
power, which helps its speakers compete for important resources in the diaspora (like 
local religious leadership or important contacts with co-nationals somewhere else in the 
EU).  
Secondly, the findings provide evidence that informants take pride in Urdu, as 
they envision and invest in it as the only legitimate home (nation-state-building) 
language; that is, as a sign of modern Islamic ‘Pakistaniness’. Finally, the data points to 
the fact that Punjabi is, by contrast, silenced and at times even called or hidden as 
‘Urdu’, because it is devalued and categorised (even by its speakers) as the ‘homey’ 
intimate heritage language of the poor and illiterate. Accordingly, Punjabi-speaking 
identities and affiliations remain invisible, despite some occasional attempts to 
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incorporate this language in this ‘Muslim’ ‘Pakistani’ place, in actions which quite 






In this paper, I have provided a critical sociolinguistics ethnographic approach to home 
and host language ideologies and identity practices by four Pakistani men who 
networked in a Southern European bilingual society, Catalonia. More specifically, I 
have taken a political economic perspective on the ways in which their ideologies and 
language-mediated social categorisations interplay and mutually inform each other, 
shedding light onto newer linguistic hierarchisations, in the diaspora. I have argued that 
this approach may offer a more comprehensive picture of diasporic linguistic 
incorporation practices linked to home language maintenance (and change), because it 
allows for the problematization of ‘fixed’, territorialised notions of languages and 
speakers, in multilingual transnational migration contexts.  
To this end, I have taken the four Pakistani migrants’ language resources, 
understood as individual multilingual-competence repositories (limited to Spanish, 
Catalan, English, Urdu and Punjabi), as the locus whereby to understand the 
rationalities behind their socially-stratifying linguistic behaviours, on a case-study basis, 
ethnographically analysed for over two years. This has allowed me to ingrain situated 
and contextualised micro language ideology displays and identity enactments with 
macro socioeconomic transformations and political structures which govern the 
citizenship regimes and language-based personhood legitimacies of the globalised new 
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economy. This has helped me to unpack the complex ways in which Pakistani migrants’ 
home languages got re-territorialised and re-politicised in interactions among 
themselves, with other migrant groups, and with local populations. 
With regard to Pakistanis diasporic sociolinguistic behaviour, the findings show 
that informants share a strong monolingual mind-set concerning their home and host 
language resources. This provides further evidence of the pervasiveness of monolingual 
ideologies in multilingual diasporic contexts, within migrant groups which are 
systematically sanctioned precisely on the basis of their multilingual practices. In this 
sense, this paper speaks of how migrants in the diaspora may participate in, and 
reproduce, the exclusionary language-mediated social categorisation practices to which 
they are subjected, both in their host and home societies. Linked to this, the paper also 
shows that migrants’ languages remain largely unknown and unmanaged not only in 
institutional domains (which has long been attested for the EU; see Hogan-Brun, Mar-
Molinero & Stevenson, 2009), but also in spaces which are regulated by and for 
migrants themselves. In these alternative spaces, too, linguistic diversity is perceived as 
a ‘problem’ and is managed through the establishment of a unified floor in and only in 
the majority host language.   
In sum, this paper sheds light on how migrants in diasporic contexts foster 
language maintenance of home nation-sate majority codes only, downplaying the use, 
and hindering the vitality of, home minority languages, in migration contexts where 
their speakers are already positioned as delanguaged and deskilled. This may further 
exacerbate practices of social differentiation and exclusion on the basis of language, in 
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Notes 
1
 Quotation marks (as in ‘illegal’, ‘ethnic’, etc.) are employed throughout this paper to 
highlight emic descriptions of migrant populations. The adjectives ‘home’ and ‘host’, 
used to make reference to the languages that originated, respectively, in Pakistan and 
Catalonia, are not to be taken as dichotomous or mutually exclusive, since I approach 
informants as multilingual individuals making use of all the language resources that 
they possess (see Section 2).    
2
 In this paper, I only analyse on English, Urdu and Punjabi, which were the only home 
languages mentioned by informants during the study. This means that I only focus on 
the prevalent languages in Pakistan, thereby downplaying the other home languages that 
may be part of the informants’ linguistic background and of their multilingual resources 
(see Section 2.2). 
3 The data was collected with voice informed consent and was anonymised. The 
protection of the informants’ identities was ensured by the Ethics Committee at the 




                                                                                                                                                                          
4
 No audio-recordings took place inside the call shop, since the cooperative of lawyers 
Col.lectiu Ronda who advised me on legality matters throughout the research process 
warned me that voice recognition techniques could be used to identify undocumented 
individuals. 
5
 Due to my very limited knowledge of the informants’ languages, these choices were 
reduced to Catalan, Spanish and English, with Spanish clearly predominating as their 
choice.  
 






@Bck:  Background information  
%com:  contextual information about the previous turn 
%tra:   free translation of the turn for languages other than English 
[=! ]  body language, proxemics 
#   pause 
[/]  repetition 
< >   scope 
:   lengthened vowel 
[…]  Turns omitted for space or confidentiality constraints 
.   end-of-turn falling contour 
?   end-of-turn rising contour 
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!   end-of-turn exclamation contour 
 
